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Abstract - In the quest to expand access to financial services in rural areas the 
agricultural development bank is re-examined. Four issues that need to be addressed in 
the restructuring of these institutions are discussed, viz. the arguments for intervention, 
the rules that need to be applied in the context of the new approach to development 
finance, the management of the restructuring process and the politics of change. These 
issues or rules are applied to the restructuring process of retail development banks at the 
provincial level in South Africa. It is illustrated that for successful transformation 
political will and a shared vision are also necessities. The impact of appropriate 
transformation is quantitatively illustrated by the impact on financial self-sustainability in 
one such bank when these aspects have been adequately addressed in the transformation 
process and the failure in the remaining institutions when they are not. 
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Abstract ~ In the quest to expand access to financial services in rural areas the agricultural 
developme*t bank is re-examined. Four issues that need to be addressed in the restructuring of 
these institutions are discussed, viz, the. arguments for intervention, the rules that need to be 
applied in /the context of the new approach to development finance, the management of the 
restructuriqg process and the politics of change. These issues or rules are applied to the 
restructuri 'g process of retail development banks at the provincial level in South Africa. It is 
illustrated at for successful transformation political will and a shared vision are also necessities. 
The impac of appropriate transformation is quantitatively illustrated by the impact on financial 
self-sustain bility in one such bank when these aspects have been adequately addressed in the 
transforma ·on process and the failure in the remaining institutions when they are not. 
Int~oduction. 
To ay the institutional profile of development finance at the retail level is wide and varied 
and far diffi rent from the mono-institutional culture from the 1950s to 1980s. The result in terms 
of clients o taining access to financial markets is remarkable. Since the 1970s it is also an urban 
story. Nev rtheless access to financial services in rural areas of developing countries continue to 
be a_ vexin~ problem and th~ deba~e still c-ontinues on wh~t wo~!d be the_ be_st ,institutional format 
for improv~ng access. Dunng this debate the market failure mterventiomst ' lobby also spoke 
out frequen(tly. 
In this paper we turn to these debates on a country specific basis. After providing an 
overview o the discussion on whether intervention is justified we provide a general overview of 
the history f agricultural development banks and then relate experience and lessons to the recent 
restructuri of development banks in South Africa. We base our discussion on the experience in 
three provi ces in South Africa, covering four development banks. The aim of this paper is to 
highlight is es and lessons learned. 
i 
Th~ arguments around intervention or beyond market and the state 
Go~ernment intervention is typically defended to provide public goods (health, nutrition, 
mass vaccir.ations, education, etc.) since without this intervention supply would be less than 
optimal. TIµs is due to the inability of private agents or suppliers of these services to internalise 
the positivq externalities to society at large generated by the supply of these goods and services. 
These seiv1ces have been characteristically supplied directly by government through traditional 
channels of Public Finance (i.e. government expenditures). However, more recently in some 
developed I countries outsourcing and voucher movements have emerged challenging the 
governmenf s continued supply of these services. . 
De~elopment Finance, on the other hand, is not designed to supply public goods. On the 
contrary, as the name implies development finance institutions (DFis) supply loans or equity 
finance to, linter alia, private businesses, individuals and local authorities. The contrast to public 
finance is qlear. DFis expect to be repaid. The question arises why can't private lenders make 
these loants What justification is there for the government to intervene in private markets to 
either prov de these services or subsidise their supply by others? Four arguments are frequently 
made to ustify the intervention of government in financial markets: (i) monopoly; (ii) 
externalitie~; (iii) imperfect information; and (iv) contract enforcement problems (Besley, 1992). 
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Most researchers of market failure invariably end their statements for government 
interventioi!i by recommending once again, the tried and tested policies of government failure in 
the past, i.e. government credit programs, targeted credit, and subsidised interest rates. This is 
done desp~te the fact that the financial landscape of developing countries is littered with the 
carcasses df dead and half-dead government, targeted lending programs with subsidised interest 
rates. None of these traditional recommendations get to the "core" of the problem, i.e. the causes 
of information deficiencies and/or contract enforcement problems. 
i 
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Intermediation in rural areas 
Fin4ncial intermediation for banks and clients is more difficult and costly in rural. than in 
urban areas because of three inescapable rural characteristics, viz. spatial dispersion and the 
associated high information and transaction costs; specialisation of rural areas in a few economic 
activities li$ked directly or indirectly to agriculture, which exposes rural clients to the vagaries of 
nature and leads to covariance of their . incomes; and seasonality of production with its 
accompanying sharp and opposite fluctuations in the demand for credit and deposit services 
(Coetzee, 11997). . 
Specialised farm credit institutions, the mechanisms of the conventional supply-led 
-approach t~ rural credit, are poorly adapted to the difficulties associated with rural finance. They 
typically dd not diversify their client base and portfolio within rural areas. They usually are not 
integrated into larger institutions with urban operations and have limited urban diversification 
and risk p~oling opportunities. Even with inter-regional risk pooling they remain vulnerable to 
major drou~hts affecting an entire country or to international commodity price slumps. 
Ag~icultural development banks 
"Why are specialised farm credit institutions established in low-income countries, and 
why do tij.ey frequently flounder?" were questions posed by Von Pischke (1978). These 
institutions I have often been used by states as conduits for carrying out agricultural and social 
policies, such as compensating the farm sector for excessive taxation of agriculture and urban 
bias. This ~as led to a lack of an autonomous governance structure. It is this lack of autonomy 
that has crippled these institutions rather than state ownership per se. Because government has 
pursued social and agricultural policy objectives via rural financial institutions, these institutions 
have been I particularly vulnerable to collusion by their politically organised clients. Using 
specialised i financial institutions to compensate farm sectors or pursue social objectives has 
mostly been futile. All the participants in the agricultural sector suffer from bad policies, bad 
prices and/?r bad weather, however only a minority of better off clients have access to credit and 
therefore received "compensation". Supply-led subsidised credit invariably worsened wealth and 
income distribution. 
Thi~ experience induced a re-examination of rural financial markets. The market was 
rediscovered and these institutions, being supply-led in nature, obviously did not meet the 
requirements of the new approach to rural finance. In the drive towards the market specialised 
credit institlutions were sidelined. Recently, the realisation dawned that in countries with a weak 
private fin~cial sector these were the only institutions providing services in rural areas, albeit 
within a distorted and skewed policy framework. Even where the private commercial banks have 
a prominenlt presence, it still is not willing to provide financial services on a broad basis in rural 
areas. An 'example is South Africa where the number of people in close proximity to a 
commercial bank branch declined from 52% in 1995 to 34% in 1998 (Eskom, 1998). This trend is 
continuing land the reasons for this in South Africa are relatively low profits in the retail finance 
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market anqi the high cost of providing branch-based services in rural areas. The amalgamation of 
commercial banks in South Africa also contributed to the decline in the number of branches due 
to rationalisation. Over the last three years nearly I 0% of commercial bank branches were 
closed. Attention is now shifting back to development banks as one institutional form within a 
range of r~tail outlets to increase outreach in rural areas. However it is not vet clear whether this 
refocus is' noticed or supported by the la;ge multilateral development- finance institutions. 
Furthermore, development banks in their conventional guise would obviously offer no ans\vers. 
Emphasis ~s placed on the restructuring of these institutions with the objective of emulating 
commerci~l operations with a development facet, thus taking up the challenge of being self-
sustainable and having a development impact and broad outreach at the same time, a formidable 
challenge. However, some international examples of successful restructuring do exist, of which 
Bank Raiat Indonesia (Yaron, 1992) is a prime example. Based on these experiences 
restructuri g and transformation should adhere to certain guidelines such as clarifying an "arms 
length" r le for government, ensuring autonomy of the institution and entrenching good 
governance practices, minimising systemic and institutional risk, mobilising financial resources 
through inter alia savings mobilisation, adequate one off capitalisation, cost covering pricing 
policies, eriphasis on high quality personnel, ·decentralisation and staff and client incentive 
schemes a~lied to innovative micro and small enterprise lending technologies pioneered by best 
practice micro finance organisations, transparent measurement of performance, co-ordination with· 
other development efforts and caution and limited use of external donor support. 
If a transformed institution performed well, it could offer through its extensive rural 
branch net{vork a range of valuable deposit and savings services for the poor far better than NGO 
programmJs. Moreover portfolio diversification and. extensive branching would alleviate the 
covariant risk associated with site specific unit banks or limited reach NGOs. 
Ex~erience in South Africa 
i 
I 
In the recent transformation of South Africa the transformation of its development finance 
system did not receive priority attention. Specific· institutions were transformed in piece-meal 
fashion an9 the rest of the development finance sector had to take its cue from the implied policy 
of gove~ent emanating from restructuring of national level institutions. The process at the 
provincial 1 level (retail level) was unstructured and transformation approaches were not 
standardised between provinces. This led to a range of development finance institutional formats. 
In some provinces functions were pooled in one institution and these provide a so-called one-stop 
service. O~her institutions were closed. The end result was that of the more than 150 parastatal 
institutions! in the country in 1990 very few survived the ongoing political and institutional 
changes. rrhe reasons mostly focus around the abolishment of the homeland system in the 
country with the demise of apartheid and gross inefficiencies highlighted by a formal study 
commissiorjted by the government in 1996 (the Strauss Commission). 
Ag~icultural development banks escaped this ad hoc approach to transformation. The 
Strauss Commission study preceeds the restructuring of the provincial development banks. This 
study investigated access to financial services for rural people and concluded that all institutions 
providing retail financial services in rural areas suffer from extremely high costs or limited 
I 
outreach, 01r both. This includes commercial banks, NGOs and development banks. 
Shqrtly after the Strauss Commission reported the four development banks servicing rural 
areas were submitted to restructuring studies and strategies. These were the Ithala Development 
Finance Corporation Limited (Ithala) in the KwaZulu-Natal province, the Agricultural Bank of 
North We~t Province (Agribank), the Ciskeian Agricultural Bank (CAB) and the Agricultural 
Bank of Trf111skei (ABT), both from the Eastern Cape Province. In the rest of this paper it will be 
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shown that! specific differences in the restructuring processes resulted in specific outcomes. Note 
that the re~tructuring processes are not complete and that we are highlighting preliminary lessons. 
The Straus~ Commission evaluated the four institutions under discussion in detail in 1995. Most 
of these ins~itutions suffered from high subsidy dependence and low outreach 
I 
Th~ restructuring process 
Sev~ral issues are at stake in the restructuring process of development banks. Firstly, is 
the argum~nt whether a specific institution should continue to exist, thus an economic 
justificatio~ is needed for its existence. Where the institution is highly successful the argument 
can be madf that it may be crowding out the private sector. Where it is quite inefficient it can be 
argued tha~ it is costing the state more than the benefits flowing from its operations. This is the 
first issue o~ the way to restructuring. 
Thej second issue of importance is the guidelines or framework for restructuring. This 
refers to t4e emphasis of the new approach to development finance where institutions should 
simultanemisly strive to be self-sustainable and have broad outreach. In this regard the issues 
concenfratel on governance, ownership, autonomy and incentive-based systems. These guidelines 
would ensure that most of the negative elements of the conventional approach will not be present 
in a restructured institution. Of paramount importance are the governan".e structure, the selection 
of the goyerning board and incorporation of governance rules. This emphasis echoes 
international! trends in the corporate sector where governance is regarded as an important aspect 
of organisafion design and where board members of institutions have increased responsibilities. 
The~e ~spef' ts are steeped with principal agent problems, i.e., the cost of enforcement and 
morutonng f contracts. · · 
The. third important issue has to do with the· management of transformation and 
restructurini.. Even where governance and other rules have been adhered to the way this process 
is managed and supported will determine success or failure. It is _argued that most transformation 
efforts fail ue to the inability to manage this process of transformation. Eight steps are proposed 
that should pe followed (see table 1). 
i 
s to transformin 
Step I, Establishing a sense of urgency 
Step~ Forming a powerful guiding coalition 
Step 31 Creating a vision 
Step ~ Communicating that vision 
Step sl Empowering others to act on visions 
Step ~ Planning for and creating short term wins 
Step 11
1 
Consolidating improvements and producing still more change 
Ste 8 Institutionalisina new a roaches 
TheJe eight steps in may not necessarily lead to a successful transformation. It is 
I 
important t~ ensure that the people responsible for change must accept all the benefits and the 
costs of chtge (Strebel, 1997). People who perceive that the changes and transformation to 
threaten th · r interests and positions will do everything in their power to block and derail the 
change pro .ess. In the case of the transformation of the development banks in South Africa the 
four essentit' groups to buy into the proc. ess of chang. e will be the clients of these institutions, the 
political est blishment, the employees and their trade unions and the management of the banks. 
This transla es to the fourth important issue in transformation, namely the politics of the change 
i 
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process. Stakeholders can be classified in terms of the strength of their response to change and 
their attitude to change. It can be a strong reaction but positive, thereby assisting the 
transformation. If it is a weak response but negative, it can be managed. But a strong negative 
reaction CCIUl be severely damaging to the change process. 
I 
Table! 2: Assessing the transformation processes in the provincial development banks 
Issues lthala Eastern Ca e banks Agribank 
Question f intervention Yes Yes Yes 
Applicaticpn of "rules" of the new approach Yes Yes No -
Management of the process Yes No No 
Poli~!cs ophe _change process . Yes . . . No,, . . No 
Yes md1cates adherence or fulfilment of the issues outlmed while ·'No md1cates non-adherence 
In I measuring the transformation processes of the banks in the three provinces against 
these fourl issues (rules) several lessons emerge (see table 2). It is clear that the four rules were 
not applied equally in the different processes. This resulted in different outcomes with respect to 
self-sustaitability and outreach for the different institutions, and in the case of the Agribank of 
the North1 ~est province t?e trans~ormation pro~es~ faltered completely. It~ala in KwaZulu-
Natal provmce succeeded m_fulfilling all the cntena stated. This resulted m a smooth and 
focused trfU1sformation process, supported by the stakeholders. In the Eastern Cape the process 
also faltered, not due to political interference but more due to a lack of dedicated political 
support. 1Jhe before (1995) and after transformation (1998) results of the institutions underscore 
the impact of the different levels of success on the viability and development reach of these 
institution$ (see Figure 1). Note that the Eastern Cape banks are treated as one entitity in the 
restructurip.g process. 
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Figure ti: Subsidy Dependence Index2 measurements for provincial development banks in 
South Africa, 1995 to 1998 (note the 1998 measure for Agribank is an estimate) 
i 
C~nclusions 
Th~ reality of the absence of private sector retail financial institutions in rural areas, 
compared to urban areas, necessitate the application of a broad range of institutions and also a re-
examinatic)n of the role of agricultural development banks. This, however, implies development 
banks in a different guise and namely the need for restructuring with the economic rationale and 
2 The SDI 1*s been developed by Jacob Yaron (1992). It measures all subsidies flowing to a DFI and compares the 
subsidy flow with the ability of the D FI to generate its own income, thus a measure of self-sufficiency. 
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principles ~f restructuring clearly spelled out. Though necessary, this is not sufficient. The 
process of, transformation must be managed efficiently along with the political dimensions of 
transformation. This relates to the impact of transformation on the different stakeholders in these 
• • I 
inst1tut1onsj Experience in South Africa indicates that over and above the four critical rules or 
questions, ~he process must have a clear vision of the eventual outcome and all stakeholders must 
share this. !Specifically with respect to the political leaders the process will not succeed without 
the politic will to go through with the transformation. The financial indicators in figure I 
clearly indi ate the success story in Ithala when these aspects have been adequately addressed in 
the transfo mation process and the failure in the remaining institutions when they are not. 
I 
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